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ABSTRACT. Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem
conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a
result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002)
[Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The
Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this
argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to
non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and
this explains the zombie intuition. I argue that this strategy fails. The con-
siderations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their
analysis in fact do no such thing. Further, their main argument for the
analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine the
view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional
analysis is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is the
analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition’s plausibility
indicates that the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the
conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable view about
what explaining the intuition would require.
Zombies make trouble for physicalism. They are deﬁned as
creatures that lack consciousness but are physically and func-
tionally identical to conscious human beings: there is nothing
it is like to be a zombie.1 Intuitively, such creatures are con-
ceivable, and their conceivability is often taken to support the
claim that they are metaphysically possible. But if they are
metaphysically possible, then – most agree – physicalism is
false.2
John Hawthorne (2002) and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003)
have developed a novel response to this argument. They con-
tend that physicalists can accommodate the zombie intuition
by embracing a certain view about phenomenal concepts: con-
cepts that express phenomenal qualities from the ﬁrst-person
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perspective. The view is that these concepts have a conditional
structure: if the world contains appropriate non-physical
states, then our phenomenal concepts refer to those states; but
if the world is merely physical, then our phenomenal concepts
refer to physical states. By using this conditional analysis of
phenomenal concepts physicalists can, according to Haw-
thorne and Braddon-Mitchell, undermine the zombie argu-
ment.3
I will present three objections to this strategy. First, the
considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in
support of the conditional analysis provide no such support.
Second, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating:
similar reasoning would undermine the view it is meant to
establish. Third, on closer inspection the conditional analysis
is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is
the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intui-
tion’s plausibility indicates that the analysis is incorrect. At
the end, I will suggest that the appeal of the conditional-anal-
ysis strategy may derive from a mistaken view about what
explaining the intuition would require.4
1. THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell agree that the zombie intu-
ition is strong. Further, both accept that modal intuitions can
be used as a guide to metaphysical possibility, albeit a fallible
one. But they contend that, the zombie intuition can be ade-
quately explained in a way that is compatible with physical-
ism. The key, on their view, is to come to a proper
understanding of the semantics of phenomenal concepts.
Phenomenal concepts are ﬁrst-person concepts of phenome-
nal qualities: concepts that express qualia from the experienc-
ing subject’s perspective.5 So, for example, if I ever taste
Vegemite, I might acquire a phenomenal concept of a distinc-
tive sort of gustatory experience. One can refer to conscious
experiences under phenomenal concepts. For example, the
phenomenal concept ‘‘pain’’ can be used to refer to pains as
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experiences with a certain felt quality.6 How, semantically, do
such concepts work?
One answer is provided by the conditional analysis on one
version of this view, the following conditionals are a priori
true of a given phenomenal concept PC:
1. If the world contains non-physical states of the right sort, then PC re-
fers rigidly to those states.
2. If the world is merely physical, then PC refers rigidly to physical
states that play the right sort of functional role.
For example, suppose we are acquainted with non-physical
states caused in the way that the folk think pain is typically
caused. In this case, ‘‘pain’’ refers rigidly to such non-physi-
cal states. But suppose the world is merely physical. In this
case, the concept refers rigidly to certain physical states,
namely, those that play the pain role: the functional role folk
psychology typically associates with pain.7 On this version of
the conditional analysis, such claims articulate the structure
of the phenomenal pain concept. They can therefore be
known a priori.8
1 and 2 are substantive claims. Note, for example, that 2
excludes certain eliminativist views, on which the world is
merely physical but ordinary phenomenal concepts refer to
nothing at all (Churchland, 1988, pp. 43–49). But the condi-
tionals carry no commitment to (non-eliminativist) physical-
ism. A dualist could accept both. In particular, she could
accept that if the world is merely physical then ‘‘pain’’ refers
rigidly to certain physical states. On the conditional analysis,
however, such conditionals are not just true: they express the
structure of phenomenal concepts and can be known a priori.
Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell argue that the condi-
tional analysis helps explain why the zombie intuition is com-
patible with physicalism. Here is the basic idea. The analysis
allows that the world may have non-physical phenomenal
properties, in which case zombies would be metaphysically
possible. Even physicalists should not give this idea zero cre-
dence. But, Braddon-Mitchell writes,
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Intuition does not distinguish between a non-zero credence in things being
such that ‘‘there could be physical duplicates that are Zombies’’ might be
rightly thought true, and a direct intuition that it does express a truth gi-
ven how things actually are. (2003, p. 127)
On the conditional analysis, the ideas that intuition con-
fuses come apart. On the analysis, although it is conceivable
that zombies are metaphysically possible, it is also conceiv-
able that they are not. For the analysis implies that if the
world is merely physical, then phenomenal states are neces-
sarily physical states that play certain functional roles, in
which case zombies are not metaphysically possible. Thus,
armed with the analysis, physicalists can accept what is right
in the zombie intuition – that a priori zombies might be meta-
physically possible – and argue that, were we fully informed
about the actual world, we would recognize that there is no
such metaphysical possibility.
2. THE ORACLE ARGUMENT
In the next section, I will criticize how Hawthorne and Brad-
don-Mitchell use the conditional analysis to explain the zom-
bie intuition. In this section, I will explain and criticize their
main argument for the analysis.
Hawthorne writes,
. . . suppose an oracle tells you tomorrow that the world is merely physical.
Will you conclude that there is no pain, that your earlier self was making
a mistake in ascribing pain to himself on occasion? No. You will remain
convinced that you do feel pain sometimes and will reckon as pain what-
ever [physical state] plays the pain role. . . .This, I say, is all good primary
intension-theoretic reasoning, based upon thinking a priori about what to
say if certain states of aﬀairs turned out to be actual. (2002, p. 26)
Braddon-Mitchell argues similarly,
. . .the fact that. . .we (most of us) hold ﬁxed that we have phenomenal
experiences – if I become persuaded of dualism I think they are dualistic,
if I lose the faith I decide they are physical, if I regain the faith I think
they are dualistic, and so on – is what supports the idea that the concep-
tual structure is conditional. (2003, p. 121)9
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Only Hawthorne uses the oracle metaphor, but his argu-
ment and Braddon-Mitchell’s are essentially the same: we
should conclude that phenomenal concepts have a conditional
structure because of how we would (or rationally should) re-
act to certain revelations about the world. If it is revealed to
us that the relevant non-physical states exist, we will construe
conscious experiences as non-physical. But if it is revealed to
us that the world is merely physical, we will maintain that we
have conscious experiences and construe them accordingly as
certain sorts of physical states. According to Hawthorne and
Braddon-Mitchell, these reactions conﬁrm the conditional
structure of our phenomenal concepts. Call this the oracle
argument.
To evaluate the oracle argument, we should ﬁrst note that
the apriority of the relevant conditionals (e.g., claims 1 and 2
of the previous section) is crucial to the conditional-analysis
strategy. If the conditionals are a priori, this undercuts the
thesis that there is no conceptual incoherence in the zombie-
world hypothesis – in the idea of a minimal physical/func-
tional duplicate of the actual world that lacks phenomenal
consciousness. If the conditionals are a posteriori, then the
thesis is not threatened. The importance of apriority is re-
ﬂected in the title of Braddon-Mitchell’s article: ‘‘Qualia and
Analytical Conditionals.’’ He advances the conditionals as
analytic truths, so that they can support a conceptual analy-
sis, on which thoroughly physical systems can have phenome-
nal states. But if the conditionals rest on a posteriori
assumptions, then the truth of the conditional yields no such
analysis and the conditional-analysis strategy for rebutting
the zombie argument does not get oﬀ the ground.
Further reﬂection shows that our reactions to the envi-
sioned oracular revelations provide no good reason to be-
lieve that the conditionals are a priori. We react as we do
partly because we know states of consciousness exist. But,
arguably, that knowledge is a posteriori: it depends primar-
ily on our having conscious experiences, such as pain.
Therefore, our reactions do not indicate that the condition-
als are a priori.
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Braddon-Mitchell writes,
The conditional analysis I have proposed is not supposed to be a posteri-
ori. We do not look at the nature of actual qualia to ﬁnd that the condi-
tional analysis is true. It is, after all, an analysis. . . .But if it is right,
neither is it based (solely) on self-evident introspection. So how can it be
analytic? What might be the basis for the claim that something like this
analysis is true? . . .The answer is that it describes how agents seem actu-
ally to behave. (2003, p. 131)
But agents behave in the relevant ways partly because of their
conﬁdence in their a posteriori knowledge that pains occur.
Without this knowledge, the oracle’s statement that the world
is merely physical should not lead us to conclude that pains
are physical states that play the pain role. Our conclusion
should instead be disjunctive: either pains are physical or
there are no pains.
Hawthorne recognizes the difﬁculty but is unmoved:10
If an oracle told me that the world is merely physical, the objection runs,
I will only be tempted to conclude that there is pain and it is whatever
plays the pain role insofar as I already have a posteriori knowledge that I
or other people have been in pain. This objection does not strike me as at
all decisive. We can agree that there are pains if the predicate ‘‘pain’’, as
used by us, is true of certain events. And it does seem that if the actual
world is merely physical, then it is a priori pretty obvious that the predi-
cate ‘‘pain’’ expresses some physical/cum/functional property instantiated
by certain events. (2002, p. 26)
This response is inadequate. Perhaps we could infer that
‘‘pain’’ expresses a physical/cum/functional property from the
assumptions that (a) the world is merely physical and (b)
there are pains. This much might qualify as ‘‘pretty obvious.’’
But it is far from obvious that assumption (a) alone licenses
the inference. One might instead infer that there are no pains.
Without (b), which is arguably a posteriori, both possibilities
remain open.
Hawthorne gives a second response: his argument goes
through nonetheless. He writes,
[I]t seems a priori eminently possible that an oracle tells us that the actual
world is merely physical, even in light of our empirical knowledge that
there are pains. (Hawthorne 2002, 27–28)
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Call this claim EPP for epistemic possibility of physicalism.
There is a weak and a strong way to interpret EPP. Both are
inadequate.
Here is the weak reading:
(Weak EPP) We do not know with absolute certainty that an oracle will
not tell us that the world, which we know a posteriori to include pains, is
merely physical.
Weak EPP is true but trivial. No theory of mind is known
with absolute certainty. Nothing interesting follows about the
semantics of phenomenal concepts. After all, an oracle might
tell us that phenomenal concepts do not have a conditional
structure. But this bare epistemic possibility would be a poor
reason for Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell to give up their
analysis. So, on the weak reading, EPP cannot rescue the ora-
cle argument.
Here is the strong reading:
(Strong EPP) Even in light of our a posteriori knowledge that there are
pains, no a priori reasoning could exclude the possibility that the world is
merely physical.
Strong EPP, if true, would help support the conditional
analysis. But why should we accept strong EPP? Hawthorne
provides no argument for it. Yet the zombie argument is a
line of a priori reasoning designed to exclude the possibility of
merely physical worlds with conscious experiences, such as
pain. In eﬀect, disproving strong EPP occupies a large portion
of The Conscious Mind (Chalmers, 1996). There David Chal-
mers combines a posteriori (ﬁrst-person) knowledge of con-
scious experience with extensive a priori reasoning to exclude
the possibility that the world, which contains conscious expe-
riences, is merely physical.11 To assert strong EPP without
argument is tantamount to declaring by ﬁat that no such
argument could succeed. This is plainly question-begging.
Thus, on the weak reading EPP fails to rescue the condi-
tional analysis, and on the strong reading EPP is question-
begging. If Hawthorne’s response appears convincing, this
may derive from a tacit equivocation on the two readings.
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Some of Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell’s remarks might
be taken to suggest a third response to my objection:
You claim that our conﬁdence in the existence of pain explains our
behavioral dispositions with respect to the usage of ‘‘pain’’ (such as the
disposition to maintain that pain exists, even in light of the revelation
that the world is merely physical). This explanation is backwards: our
conﬁdence in our judgment that pain exists is explained by our recogni-
tion that no discovery about the nature of the world would undermine
that judgment. In other words, you wrongly assume that our knowledge
that pain exists grounds our behavioral dispositions; in fact, those disposi-
tions ground our knowledge.12
However, I claim only that the relevant dispositions depend
on a posteriori assumptions, such as the assumption that pain
exists. I need not deny that the dispositions also contribute to
our conﬁdence in the existence of pain (nor need I deny that
the dispositions partly constitute the concept). Perhaps reﬂec-
tion on oracle scenarios should make us even more conﬁdent
that pain exists than we are in the absence of such reﬂection.
But this is beside the point: insofar as our reactions to the
oracle are driven by a posteriori assumptions, these reactions
do not support the apriority of the relevant conditionals. And
again, our reactions are driven by our knowledge that pain
exists, which is arguably a posteriori.13
If I am wrong and the oracle argument works, then sur-
prising consequences follow. Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitch-
ell consider two oracle scenarios: one in which an oracle tells
us that the world is merely physical, and one in which an
oracle tells us that the world is not merely physical. In both
scenarios, we would maintain that pain exists, and Haw-
thorne and Braddon-Mitchell regard this as conﬁrmation of
the conditional analysis. Let us consider two other oracle sce-
narios and see where this form of reasoning leads.
Suppose that an oracle tells us that nothing plays the pain
role. If this is hard to imagine, suppose the oracle prefaces its
remark about the pain role with a more general revelation:
our beliefs about causality involve some deep illusion; thus
there are no true claims of form X plays functional role R
(perhaps the oracle alludes to Malebranche’s views on the
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subject). Faced with the revelation that nothing plays the
pain role, what would we conclude? That pain does not exist?
Of course not. We would conclude that pain does not play
the pain role. By parity of reasoning, we should then accept
the following conditional as a priori: if nothing plays the pain
role, then ‘‘pain’’ refers rigidly to states that do not play the
pain role. That is a strong result. It would refute analytic
functionalism, on which it is a priori that: if nothing plays the
pain role, then ‘‘pain’’ refers to nothing. The same point ap-
plies to other views on which there are substantive a priori
truths about consciousness. This result is suspicious: it in-
dicates that the oracle argument proves too much.
Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell might not ﬁnd this con-
sequence repugnant. They might even welcome it, since nei-
ther accepts analytic functionalism. But there is a related
consequence that they cannot happily accept. Let us combine
one of the original oracle scenarios with the variation men-
tioned in the previous paragraph: suppose an oracle tells us
that the world is merely physical and that nothing plays the
pain role. We would conclude that there are pains that, al-
though merely physical, do not play the pain role. So, by par-
ity of reasoning, we should conclude that it is not a priori
that if the world is merely physical then ‘‘pain’’ refers rigidly
to physical states that play the pain role. This result contra-
dicts the conditional analysis. Similar reasoning can be ap-
plied to other phenomenal concepts. Thus, the oracle
argument would, if sound, undermine the very analysis it was
designed to support. The argument is, in that sense, self-
defeating.14
Our reactions to the hypothetical scenarios that Hawthorne
and Braddon-Mitchell consider do have at least two non-triv-
ial consequences. First, our reactions might support the truth
of certain conditionals, such as 1 and 2 of the preceding sec-
tion. But as I have emphasized, the conditional-analysis strat-
egy requires that the conditionals be not merely true but a
priori. Second, our reactions indicate that our conﬁdence in
the existence of states of consciousness is greater than our
conﬁdence in any particular theory of consciousness. But this
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observation neither supports the conditional analysis nor
undercuts the claim that there is no a priori incoherence in
the zombie-world hypothesis. We often have greater conﬁ-
dence in our a posteriori beliefs than in our a priori beliefs. I
am more conﬁdent in my a posteriori belief that I have ex-
isted for at least 360 seconds than I am in my a priori belief
that the sum of a trapezoid’s angles is 360 degrees. If an ora-
cle tells me that only one of them is true, I will maintain my
a posteriori belief about having existed for at least 6 minutes.
But the fact that I would so react does not undercut my a
priori belief about the trapezoid. That fact should not lead
me to suspect that my geometrical calculations were faulty.
Moral: reactions to oracular revelations do not test for ap-
riority. Such reactions can neither conﬁrm nor disconﬁrm the
apriority of Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell’s conditionals.
The oracle argument fails.
3. EXPLAINING THE ZOMBIE INTUITION
Suppose the conditional analysis is correct. Does it help ex-
plain the zombie intuition, as Hawthorne and Braddon-
Mitchell claim? To answer this question, we must get clearer
on what the intuition is. Put simply, the idea is just that
zombies are conceivable. Chalmers’ abbreviations help clarify
this idea. Let P be the complete physical truth about the
world. Let T be a second-order ‘‘that’s all’’ claim that says
that the world contains all and only what P implies. Let Q
be an arbitrary truth about qualia, e.g., that there are qualia,
that the president has states with qualia, or that most people
have states with qualia. The zombie intuition can be
expressed as the claim that the conjunction of P and T is a
priori compatible with the denial of Q. That is, we can
coherently conceive the hypothesis that PT&~Q; a priori, the
actual world might be like this – a minimal physical/
functional duplicate of the actual world, but without
consciousness.15
At this point a problem emerges. On the conditional analy-
sis, the conjunction of P and T entails that qualia are neces-
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sarily physical states that play certain functional roles. So, on
the analysis, PT&~Q can be ruled out a priori. Thus, far from
explaining the zombie intuition, the conditional analysis is
incompatible with it.16
Braddon-Mitchell considers this objection (which he attri-
butes to Chalmers). In response, he concedes that on the con-
ditional analysis PT&~Q is not a priori conceivable, and he
oﬀers a diagnosis of why this hypothesis seems conceivable.
He suggests that the hypothesis seems conceivable because we
confuse it with what I will call the doubly modal claim: the
claim that it is conceivable that zombies are metaphysically
possible. As he puts it,
[T]he epistemic gap between physical states and qualia is a shadow of the
conceivability of the possibility. (2003, p. 129)
What should we make of Braddon-Mitchell’s proposal?
The conditional analysis would explain the doubly modal
claim. But does the intuitive force of the zombie intuition de-
rive from confusing the doubly modal claim with the claim
that zombies are conceivable? This seems unlikely. The differ-
ence between the two claims is glaring. We do sometimes cru-
dely misdescribe our modal intuitions with disastrous results:
witness pre-Kripkean claims purporting to establish contin-
gent identities. But when Kripke (1972) distinguishes imagin-
ing Hesperus without itself from imagining Hesperus’s not
being the morning’s last visible heavenly body, we lose the
inclination to claim that we can do the former. By contrast,
the zombie-world hypothesis seems coherent even after we
distinguish it from the doubly modal claim. Here there is no
temptation to believe that what we were conceiving all along
was the proposed alternative. Even after careful reﬂection on
Braddon-Mitchell’s distinction, no incoherence emerges from
the original hypothesis that PT&~Q.17
Braddon-Mitchell reports that his explanation ‘‘is not a
technical by-product of [his] account, but accounts for widely
shared intuitions’’ (2003, p. 129). That may be, but it does not
plausibly explain away the zombie intuition. It does not weak-
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en our conﬁdence in the coherence of the zombie-world
hypothesis.
Hawthorne claims that if the conditional analysis is correct,
then
[W]e will not be conﬁdent that zombies would remain conceivable were
[we] to be fully informed about the actual world, even though we will be
conﬁdent that zombies would remain conceivable were we to be given the
Physical Worldbook and told that its contents [=P] were true. (2002,
p. 25)
This suggests another deﬂationary explanation of the zom-
bie intuition: we think zombies are conceivable because we
confuse the zombie-world hypothesis with one that lacks the
second-order ‘‘that’s all’’ claim. In other words, we confuse
PT&~Q with P&~Q.
This diagnosis has the same problem as Braddon-Mitchell’s.
Consider again the contrast with Kripke’s diagnosis of intui-
tions purporting to establish contingent identities. One might
initially describe what one imagines as imagining Hesperus
without itself. But once Kripke provides his alternative
description, in terms of being in the same qualitative situa-
tion, etc., it is clear that one’s initial description was wrong.
By contrast, even when the distinction between PT&~Q and
P&~Q is kept ﬁrmly in mind, the former seems a priori coher-
ent.
The upshot is that the conditional analysis fails to account
for the right sort of epistemic intuition. To reinforce this
point, consider another widely discussed intuition: that which
drives the knowledge argument. In Frank Jackson’s (1982)
famous example, Mary is raised in a black-and-white room
and learns all the physical and functional information with-
out seeing colors. Then she leaves the room and sees colors
for the ﬁrst time. If the conditional analysis is correct, then
before she leaves the room she is in a position to deduce
a priori all the information about seeing in color from P&T.
But intuitively, she is in no such position: intuitively, no
a priori reasoning she could do would change the fact that
when she leaves the room she gains information about what
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it’s like to see in color. If she does gain such information,
then the conditional analysis is false. The conditional analysis
does not even appear to leave room for arguing, as many
have, that she gains phenomenal color concepts (but no infor-
mation) when she leaves the room.18 On the conditional anal-
ysis, it seems, she has those before she leaves.
Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell claim that their analysis
allows physicalists to accommodate the intuitions driving
anti-physicalist arguments such as the zombie argument. But,
their analysis does not accommodate the crucial intuitions: it
simply denies them.
In the previous section, I argued that the main argument
for the conditional analysis fails. I can now draw a stronger
conclusion: since the analysis is incompatible with the zom-
bie intuition, the intuition counts against the analysis. So
does the intuition that Mary gains information when she
leaves the room. Thus, not only do we lack good reasons to
accept the conditional analysis: we have strong intuitive rea-
sons to reject it.19
4. IS OPEN-MINDEDNESS ENOUGH?
To summarize: Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell fail to
make a convincing case for the conditional analysis. The ora-
cle argument wrongly assumes that our reactions to hypothet-
ical oracular revelations support the apriority of the relevant
conditionals. Further, the argument is self-defeating: similar
reasoning would refute the analysis it is meant to support.
Even if the analysis is correct, it does not help explain the
zombie intuition: on the contrary, the two are incompatible.
And on reﬂection, Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell’s propo-
sals about how the intuition derives from relatively simple
confusions lack plausibility.
Even so, the conditional-analysis strategy has prima facie
appeal. It would be nice to know why. One factor may be
that, as Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell make abundantly
clear, the analysis accords well with widely discussed inter-
pretations of two-dimensional semantics. But as Braddon-
Mitchell states (2003, p. 133, fn. 38) and Hawthorne clearly
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recognizes, two-dimensionalism provides no justiﬁcation for
the analysis: the analysis must be defended on independent
grounds.
Another factor is more interesting. Hawthorne and Brad-
don-Mitchell’s articles may leave one with the following
impression: as long as the physicalist allows that zombies
might be metaphysically possible, she has accounted for the
intuitive data. I call this the view that open-mindedness is en-
ough. I do not know whether Hawthorne or Braddon-Mitch-
ell would endorse this view. But their approach encourages it,
and this might partly explain the strategy’s allure. After all,
the conditional analysis delivers the result that, even if physi-
calism is true, it is a priori conceivable that zombies are meta-
physically possible.
However, the view that open-mindedness is enough is
untenable. All reasonable philosophers, including dyed-in-the-
wool physicalists, must concede that there is some chance,
however small, that consciousness is non-physical. This is
merely a concession to minimal rationality: no philosophical
theory is known with complete certainty. This concession
does not constitute accounting for the zombie intuition, in
the sense that Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell intend. If it
did, we would hardly need a sophisticated semantic theory of
phenomenal concepts to do the job. Of course, one might
deny that we should take the intuition seriously. But Haw-
thorne and Braddon-Mitchell want to explain it, and this re-
quires more than allowing for the bare epistemic possibility
that consciousness is non-physical. Open-mindedness is not
enough.20
NOTES
1 By ‘‘consciousness’’ I mean phenomenal consciousness. For the distinc-
tion between phenomenal consciousness and other varieties, see Block
(1995) and Chalmers (1996).
2 For the zombie argument, see Part II of Chalmers (1996). For earlier
versions, see Kirk (1974) and Campbell (1970).
3 I take the name ‘‘conditional analysis’’ from Braddon-Mitchell, who
describes his view as ‘‘a conditional analysis of ‘quale’.’’ Hawthorne does
not use this terminology. He instead calls the relevant concepts ‘‘totality-
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dependant concepts,’’ but his idea is essentially the same. Where I use the
term ‘‘phenomenal concept,’’ Braddon-Mitchell uses ‘‘the concept of
quale,’’ while Hawthorne uses ‘‘concepts pertaining to experience’’ and
focuses mostly on the concept of pain.
4 My objections apply mutatis mutandis to Stalnaker’s (2002) view,
which is similar to the views of Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell. All
three philosophers couch their discussions partly in terms of the two-
dimensional semantic framework recently developed by Frank Jackson
(1998), David Chalmers (1996), and others. Since my criticisms are not
technical, I leave the two-dimensionalism in the background.
5 Throughout I use ‘‘qualia’’ in a weak sense on which qualia could turn
out to be physical.
6 I follow Hawthorne in using quotation marks to indicate reference to
concepts.
7 I take the phrase ‘‘the pain role’’ from Hawthorne. As he notes, his
formulation of (what I call) the conditional analysis leaves various ques-
tions unanswered. For example, what if ‘‘the world is merely physical and
there is some state that plays most but not all of the pain role’’ (2002, pp.
47–48, fn. 13)? And as Braddon-Mitchell asks, if the world is merely phys-
ical, what is required for creatures unlike human beings to have pain?
Analytic functionalists (Armstrong, 1968; Lewis, 1972) believe that ‘‘pain’’
picks out whatever physical states occupy the pain role. By contrast, psy-
chofunctionalists believe that ‘‘pain’’ picks out ‘‘states similar in some
way to the states that occupy the [pain role] in us. . .’’ (Braddon-Mitchell,
2003, pp. 120–121; cf. Block, 1978 and Chalmers, 2003a). Nothing I say
about the conditional analysis turns on how such questions are answered.
8 I base this formulation of the conditional analysis on Hawthorne’s,
which diﬀers somewhat from Braddon-Mitchell’s. In particular, Braddon-
Mitchell would reject 2 in favor of the following conditional: (2¢) If the
world is merely physical, then PC refers to the physical states that play
the relevant functional roles actually or counterfactually. So, on the ver-
sion he prefers, a phenomenal concept does not refer to a physical state in
worlds where that state does not play the relevant functional role. How-
ever, my criticisms of the version of the analysis that involves 2 instead of
2¢ apply mutatis mutandis to Braddon-Mitchell’s version. For simplicity, I
will continue as though Braddon-Mitchell endorses 2 rather than 2¢. Haw-
thorne and Braddon-Mitchell’s views diﬀer in other ways too. For exam-
ple, Braddon-Mitchell relativizes the a priori conditionals to a given
speaker at the center of the actual world, but Hawthorne does not, at
least not explicitly. Here these subtle diﬀerences do not matter.
9 Braddon-Mitchell elaborates in Section 4 of his article.
10 Hawthorne attributes the objection to David Chalmers.
11 Chalmers does not rule out the view, associated with Russell, that
‘‘consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental
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physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical
dispositions’’ (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 264; cf. Chalmers, 1996, pp. 153–155).
So, he allows that the world might be merely physical, but only in a sense
in which consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe. Here I
ignore this complication. In advancing the conditional analysis, Haw-
thorne means to provide a way of defending more traditional sorts of
physicalism, on which consciousness is not fundamental. Indeed, he criti-
cizes a version of the Russellian view in the second part of Hawthorne
(2002, pp. 39–52).
12 See Braddon-Mitchell (2003, especially pp. 131–133). I thank an anon-
ymous referee for bringing this response to my attention.
13 There is yet another response that, though not suggested by Haw-
thorne or Braddon-Mitchell, is worth mentioning: ‘‘In order to wonder
whether pain exists, I must have the concept of pain. But I could not
have the concept of pain without having had pain. So, if I can wonder
whether pain exists, pain exists. I am presently wondering whether pain
exists. Therefore, pain exists. Thus, I can deduce that pain exists by con-
ceptual reﬂection alone. However, this argument has at least three prob-
lems. First, the concept empiricism on which it is based is open to
question. Consider Donald Davidson’s (1986) Swampman, a creature
who is created by a cosmic accident—lightning hits a dead tree in a
swamp—but is a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of a normal human
being. It is not obvious that Swampman lacks the pain concept before
he experiences pain. See Alter (1998, p. 54, fn. 15); Alter (forthcoming);
and Dennett (forthcoming). Second, even if we grant the concept empiri-
cism, my knowledge of the existence of pain is in fact grounded in
experience, not the proposed a priori deduction. Third and most signiﬁ-
cantly: how do I know I have the relevant pain concept, as opposed to
a zombie-analogue? The assumption that I do would appear to be based
on experience. If so, then the deduction depends on a posteriori assump-
tions. See Chalmers, 1996, pp. 203–209; and Chalmers, 2003b.)
14 This objection exploits the functionalist component of Hawthorne
and Braddon-Mitchell’s versions of the conditional analysis. One could re-
move this component by replacing conditional 2 of the Section 1 with the
following: If the world is merely physical, then phenomenal concepts refer
rigidly to physical states.
15 For present purposes, this amount of precision suﬃces, though a thor-
ough discussion of the zombie argument would require more. For a de-
tailed discussion, see Chalmers (2002). I borrow the ‘‘PT&~Q’’
formulation from the appendix of that article.
16 Chalmers makes this point against Stalnaker in the appendix of Chal-
mers (2002).
17 Here one might object that I attribute too much subtlety to the folk:
both the zombie intuition and the doubly modal claim are theory laden,
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and confusing the two might lead the folk to embrace the intuition too
readily. (I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.) However, I
do not claim that the folk grasp Braddon-Mitchell’s distinction. Arguably,
few who lack philosophical training would well understand either the
zombie intuition or the doubly modal claim. But it is unclear what follows
from this observation. Explaining away the zombie intuition presumably
requires more than showing how confusing various abstract philosophical
claims might lead the folk astray. What exactly would constitute an ade-
quate deﬂationary explanation is a complex question, which I cannot be-
gin to address in this paper. Even so the contrast with Kripke’s argument
indicates that Braddon-Mitchell has yet to make a convincing case for his
proposal.
18 For responses to the knowledge argument along these lines, see Loar
(1997), Papineau (2002), and Tye (2000).
19 In criticizing the conditional analysis, I do not mean to imply that or-
dinary terms such as ‘‘pain’’ never express conditional concepts. Perhaps
they do, in certain contexts. Indeed, Hawthorne introduces a concept
‘‘pain*’’ that conforms to the conditional analysis by stipulation; this is
unobjectionable. But the analysis does not plausibly apply to the phenom-
enal concepts used in the zombie argument. What, then, determines their
content? A natural view is that their content is determined by the intrinsic
phenomenal natures of the experiences themselves. This view is advocated
by some non-physicalists, including Kripke (1972) and Chalmers (2003b).
It is also open to many physicalists, including identity theorists and psy-
chofunctionalists, who could argue that the relevant intrinsic phenomenal
natures are physical.
20 I began work on this paper during a leave that was made possible by an
American Philosophical Society Sabbatical Fellowship and by The Univer-
isty of Alabama. I thank both institutions. I presented the paper at the 2003
Alabama Philosophical Society Annual Meeting, at Toward a Science of
Consciousness 2004, and at the 2004 Central Division Meeting of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association. Alastair Norcross kindly presented the paper
for me at the 2004 meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society. I
thank those who attended the presentations. For helpful discussions and
comments, I thank William FitzPatrick, John Hawthorne, Eric Marcus,
Stuart Rachels, my APA commentator Sarah Sawyer, Houston Smit, my
SWPC commentator Brad Thompson, an anonymous referee for Philosophi-
cal Studies, and especially David Chalmers, Mark Scala, and Chase Wrenn.
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